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CONCEPTUAL GULFS IN CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK"
It is chancy business for a lawyer who has lost a case to offer
scholarly commentary on that case. The line between criticism
and whinmng may be thin. Yet that lawyer also has the advan-
tage of having spent much tne investigating and thinkung
about the issues. I can at least record in the published scholarly
record that "Boerne" is pronounced "Berme."
I confidently expected to win the Flores case. Marci Hamilton
and others who doubted the validity of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act1 plainly had a much better sense than I of the
Court's political mood. The city's brief contained twenty-mne
citations to dissenting opimons, most of them for key points.' I
naively thought that this revealed the weakness of the city's ar-
guments. But Professor Hamilton's judgment was exactly right;
the former dissenters now had the votes to change the law
Moreover, something about the facts or politics of RFRA pro-
voked at least the acquiescence of Justices who I suspect would
not have joined the earlier dissents on which she relied. The
City of Boerne did not get all nine votes, but the most striking
fact about the case is that Archbishop Flores did not get a dis-
sent on the central issue in the case.'
* Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and Associate Dean for Research,
The Umversity of Texas School of Law; lead appellate lawyey for Archbishop Flores
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). I am grateful to Samuel
Issacharoff and LA. Powe for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Chad
Allred for research assistance. A much earlier version of this paper was presented as
the 1995 George Wythe Lecture at the William & Mary School of Law. The case is
known as Boerne to all who were involved in it, but in this Article, Bluebook con-
vention has trumped customary usage.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
2. See Brief of Petitioner at 11, 16, 22-24, 26-27, 36, 38-42, 45-46, City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (No. 95-2074), available zn 1996 WL 689630.
3. Justices Souter and Breyer did not reach the issue. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at
2185 (Souter, J., dissenting); td. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
agreed with much of the Court's opinion, but dissented on free exercise grounds. See
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My view of the matter was not entirely the self-delusion of an
advocate: six appellate courts considered the constitutionality of
RFRA prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Flores, and all
six upheld the Act.4 Five of these decisions upheld RFRA as ap-
plied to state or local law.5 Four of these decisions came from
federal courts of appeals, and each was written by a well-re-
spected, conservative judge appointed by Ronald Reagan-James
Buckley, Patrick Higginbotham, John Noonan, and Richard
Posner.6 I think that Flores dramatically changed the law, but if
it did not, then I am not the only one who was confused.
Flores was unusual for the number and magnitude of funda-
mental disagreements between the two sides. Litigation over
disputed questions of law works best when background princi-
ples are reasonably established and each side can build its argu-
ment from a starting premise that the Court is not likely to
question. In Flores, the parties disputed everything at the most
fundamental level. There were more basic points in dispute than
the Court could focus on, and more than either side could ade-
quately brief. Some of these conflicting assumptions were about
the enforcement power, some were about RFRA itself, and some
were about religious liberty. The Court's starting assumptions
turned out to be much closer to those of RFRA's opponents, so
probably RFRA was doomed from the beginning.
If the assumptions about RFRA and religious liberty dominat-
ed the decision, then Flores may be a special ticket, good for this
day and this train only. It announced an elastic standard that
might stretch to uphold anything Congress wants to enact ex-
id. at 2176 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1997); Sasnett
v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1019-22 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 469-70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of
Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); South Jersey
Catholic Sch. Teachers Ass'n v. St. Teresa Elementary Sch., 675 A.2d 1155, 1167
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), affd on other grounds, 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997);
State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. App. 1995), affd on other grounds, 549
N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
5. The exception was EEOC v. Catholic University, 83 F.3d at 469-70, which up-
held RFRA as applied to federal law.
6. See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1522 (Noonan, J.); Sasnett, 91 F.3d at 1018
(Posner, J.); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 455 (Buckley, J.); Flores, 73 F.3d at 1352
(Higginbotham, J.).
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cept RFRA. The opinion depended heavily on the Court's assess-
ment of the facts, and in future cases, the Court might find the
facts required to uphold any statute that is not RFRA.
If the assumptions about the enforcement power were suffi-
cient to drive the case without assistance from the assumptions
about RFRA and religious liberty, then Flores may mean what it
says, and the Court may find facts in the future exactly as it
found them in Flores. In that event, Flores is by far the most im-
portant of the recent round of federalism decisions. Several stat-
utes that were previously uncontroversial are now subject to
serious constitutional attack; Congress's power to protect liberty
in the states appears to have shrunk dramatically. As in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,7 nothing is overruled, but every-
thing is changed.
I. WHAT THE COURT SAID
Flores held that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to state
and local governments.8 The decision does not affect RFRA's ap-
plication to federal law, which is based on Congress's Article I
powers and in no way depends on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Flores significantly limits Congress's independent power to
protect the civil liberties of the American people. How signifi-
cantly remains to be seen, because the opinion announced a
vague standard of uncertain scope. The Court reaffirmed that
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cludes the power to enforce rights incorporated into that Amend-
ment from elsewhere in the Constitution.9 But the enforcement
power is "remedial" and not "substantive." Congress is bound by
the Court's determination of the meaning of constitutional
rights. ° Even so, the remedial power is "broad,"" and the
Court reaffirmed that Congress may "prohibit[] conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional." 2 But Congress may prohibit such
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
9. See id. at 2163-64.
10. See id. at 2164.
11. Id. at 2163.
12. Id.
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conduct only as a means to "deter or remed[y] constitutional
violations" as defined by the Court,"3 and "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."4
"[T]he line.., is not easy to discern, and Congress must have
wide latitude in determining where it lies."5 But the Court
said that "RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 6
The proportionality part of this standard seems to require an
empirical judgment: Congressional enforcement legislation is
valid only if violations of the Constitution, as interpreted by the
Court, appear in a sufficiently large proportion of all cases pre-
senting violations of the statute. The Court plainly believed that
the proportion of constitutional violations to RFRA violations
was small, and that this proportion was larger in the case of
other enforcement legislation previously upheld. But the
Court had no data on any of these proportions, and it guessed
about the number of free exercise violations without resolving
serious disputes about what would count as a violation. The
congruence and proportionality standard is inherently vague,
and the litigation process is probably incapable of producing
good data on the proportions the Court seems to require.
Without the prospect of data, we must rely on educated guess-
es. My own guess is that several important statutes do not satis-
fy this new standard if Mores is any guide to its content. The
Court did not claim otherwise. This brings me to the first of the
conceptual gulfs between the parties: What was different about
RFRA?
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2164.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2170.
17. See id. at 2169-71 (describing the Court's assessment of the need for RFRA
and comparing that to the need for the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
746 [Vol. 39:743
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II. WHAT WAS DIFERENT ABOUT RFRA?
The centerpiece of our brief was a straightforward argument
based on judicial and legislative precedent.18 From 1866 to 1991,
Congress repeatedly enacted enforcement legislation that went
beyond judicial interpretations of the constitutional right being
enforced. 9 Most of these Acts were upheld or accepted into the
fabric of the law without serious challenge. RFRA was no differ-
ent. RFRA excused the plaintiff from the obligation to prove bad
motive or overt discrimination, and instead required the state to
justify the burdens placed on religions by facially neutral laws.
Citing Title VII"2 and the Voting Rights Acts,2 we argued that
no exercise of the enforcement power is better settled than its use
to dispense with proof of bad motive or overt discrimination.
18. See Brief of Respondent Flores, Flores (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL
10293, at *10-22.
19. See Voting Rights Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (prohibiting voting
practices with discriminatory results as a means to enforce the Fifteenth Amend-
ment); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1970) (barring literacy
tests for voting in certain mostly southern states, and barring English language lit-
eracy tests for voters educated in another language in an American flag school, as
means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment); Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa (1994) (barring literacy tests and residency requirements for voting nation-
wide as means to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1982 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in con-
tracts and transactions in real property as means to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the administration of contracts as means to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) (creating civil remedy for
private conspiracies to violate civil rights as means to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(1994) (overriding state sovereign immunity as means to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and other federal rights); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000eGj), 2000e-2, 2000e-5 (1994) (extending employment discrimination
laws to government employment and overriding sovereign immunity as means to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in government employ-
ment as means to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Supplemental Prohibition Act
§ 2, 42 Stat. 222 (1921) (repealed 1935) (prohibiting certain sales of alcohol for me-
dicinal purposes as means to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment); National Prohibi-
tion Act, tit. 11, § 1, 41 Stat. 305, 307-08 (1919) (repealed 1935) (prohibiting sales of
nonintoxicating beverages with minute proportions of alcohol as means to enforce the
Eighteenth Amendment).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-1 (1994).
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RFRA's opponents believed that it was a unique statute, an
unprecedented congressional grab for power.22 The Court at
least agreed with them that RFRA went further than statutes it
had previously upheld. The Court interpreted most of the judi-
cial precedent, and some of the legislative precedent, as consis-
tent with its decision. As to the rest, the Court was silent. The
Court conspicuously did not say that the Voting Rights Act of
1982, 2 or Title VII as applied to state and local govern-
ments,2' or congressional definitions of badges and incidents of
slavery,' are congruent with and proportional to judicial defini-
tions of the underlying constitutional rights.
The Court did explain how the Voting Rights Act of 19656
met its new standard. The core provisions of the 1965 Act were
based on a voluminous congressional record showing widespread
and persistent use of facially neutral devices to prevent African
Americans from voting." But this record is unique among mod-
em legislation under the Enforcement Clauses.
The Court also attempted to explain how Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan28 fit its new theory of the enforcement power. The Court
suggested that voting rights for Puerto Ricans in New York
might have been intended as a remedy for discrimination in
public services.2 9 Acceptance of a voting rights remedy for a
public services violation suggests that the requirement of congru-
ence does not add anything to the requirement of proportionali-
ty. In addition, the Court seemed not to care that the congres-
sional record said nothing about discrimination in public servic-
es in New York. Maybe the Court assumed it could take judicial
notice of widespread ethnic discrimination in the delivery of
22. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitu-
tional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 67 (1995).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
25. See 42 U.S.C. 99 1981-1982 (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973-1973p (1970). Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act's facial ban on literacy tests) with
Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (rejecting the
claim that literacy tests are facially unconstitutional).
27. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2168 (1997).
28. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
29. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2168.
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public services. Or maybe the Court reaffirmed Morgan under
an implicit grandfather clause, and Flores's new standard is, in
practice, prospective only.
The Court also had trouble explaining Section 201 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1970,3" which banned literacy tests in the states
not subject to the 1965 Act. The Court unanimously upheld this
provision in Oregon v. Mitchell,"1 despite the lack of evidence
that literacy tests had been misused in the newly covered
states.32 The Court in Flores cited speculation in several opinions
in Oregon v. Mitchell about what Congress might have believed
when it passed Section 201,"s but even if the Court accurately
attributed these speculations to Congress, they add up to a very
thin record of occasional effects in most of the northern and west-
ern states. Flores did not comment on how the test of congruence
and proportionality might have applied in either Katzenbach v.
Morgan or Oregon v. Mitchell. The Court simply said that in each
case, the statute could be explained as remedial.'
The Court said nothing at all about the Voting Rights Act of
1982,"5 which bars any voting practice with discriminatory re-
sults. The political history of the 1982 Act, and the structural
relationship of the statutory and constitutional standards, are
indistinguishable from RFRA. RFRA was a direct congressional
response to Smith; the 1982 Voting Rights Act was a direct con-
gressional response to City of Mobile v. Bolden.36 The legisla-
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994).
31. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
32. See id. at 131-34 (Black, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (upholding
the ban without proof of discriminatory purpose); id. at 14447 (separate opinion of
Douglas, J.) (upholding the ban, noting that Congress "need not make findings as to
the incidence of literacy"); id. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (upholding the ban, relying on Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment, "[d]espite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory
application or effect"); id. at 231-36 (Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (upholding the ban, relying on the power to ban practic-
es with discriminatory effects); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, joined by Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J.) (joining Justice Black's posi-
tion on this issue).
33. See Mores, 117 S. Ct. at 2167.
34. See id. at 2167-68.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
36. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Court acknowledged the connection in Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).
19981 749
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tive history of the 1982 Act denounced Bolden as often and as
vigorously as the legislative history of RFRA denounced
Smith.17 RFRA covered nearly the whole scope of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, and the 1982 Act covers the whole scope of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Both RFRA and the 1982 Act enacted a
broad standard drawn from prior constitutional interpretation.
In each case, the Court's new constitutional standard required
discrimination that was either deliberate (in the sense of uncon-
stitutional motive) or overt (in the sense of disparate treatment,
whatever the motive) and the statutory standard that Congress
enacted in response dispensed with that requirement.38 In each
case, there was some evidence that the new statutory standard
simplified proof of constitutional violations, 9 and substantial
evidence that Congress disagreed with the new court-defined
constitutional standard. The Senate Report on the 1982 Act was
explicit about which consideration was more important: "During
the hearings, there was considerable discussion of the difficulty
often encountered in meeting the intent test, but that is not the
37. Compare S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15-43 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 192-221, with S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2-14 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1893-903.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (eliminating the Bolden standard); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
(1994) (eliminating the Smith standard).
39. Congress found that without RFRA, the government could use neutral and
generally applicable laws to deliberately discriminate against religion, and that
sometimes it would do so. Both committees found that facially neutral laws had
been used to burden religion through all or much of American history. See S. REP.
No. 103-111, at 5 & n.3, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1894-95; H.R. REP.
No. 103-88, at 2. The committees cited testimony that three of the greatest religious
persecutions in American history-that against the Mormons in the nineteenth con-
tury, that against the Jehovah's Witnesses in the 1930s and 40s, and the Ku Klux
Klan's attempt to close Catholic schools in the 1920s-had been based on facially
neutral, generally applicable laws.
Congress also heard testimony about contemporary hostility between churches
and secular interest groups, use of zoning laws to exclude minority faiths, "old-fash-
ioned religious prejudice" against Jehovah's Witnesses, continuing discrimination
against minority religions, indifference or hostility to religious needs, and hundreds
of burdens on American Indian religious practices. See Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 104, 107-08, 123-24, 149, 157-58,
326, 334-39, 436 (1992) (hereinafter House Hearings); The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act: Hearing on S.2969 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 5-6, 15-
26, 71-78, 144-45, 246-50 (1992) (hereinafter Senate Hearing).
[Vol. 39:743750
CONCEPTUAL GULFS IN FLORES
principal reason why we have rejected it. The main reason is
that, simply put, the test asks the wrong question.""
The 1982 Voting Rights Act was not aimed at efforts to pre-
vent blacks from voting; those efforts had largely ended by 1982.
Instead, it was aimed at second and third generation voting
rights problems, especially the inability of minority groups to
elect representatives either in at-large elections or in elections in
which the minority vote was dispersed across a number of sin-
gle-member districts.4 The 1982 Act requires the creation of
minority-controlled districts where there is a history of racially
polarized voting and where such districts can be drawn without
gross racial gerrymandering. 2 Neither element of this thresh-
old showing is plausibly a violation of the Constitution as the
Court interprets it. Plaintiffs seem to be able to prove racially
polarized voting almost everywhere, but it is hard to imagine
the Court holding that the electoral choices of individual voters
are unconstitutional, even when cumulated into racial patterns.
The failure to draw minority-controlled districts is not uncon-
stitutional either, nor is it sufficient evidence of likely unconsti-
tutional motive. The Constitution permits any districting scheme
not deliberately designed to reduce minority voting strength.43
State and local governments have myriad legitimate reasons,
and also a range of dubious, but clearly nonracial rea-
sons-especially party gerrymanders and incumbent protec-
tion-for at-large elections and for drawing single-member dis-
tricts one way instead of another." It seems unlikely that color-
blind districting would reliably create minority-controlled seats
outside the largest concentrations of minority population. As
with RFRA, the number of statutory violations appears
disproportionately large in relation to the number of constitu-
40. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 36 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.
41. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-53
(1992) (analyzing the evolution of voting rights cases).
42. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1969-70 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46-51 (1986).
43. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-69 (1980) (plurality opinion).
44. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 673 n.10 (1993) (White, J., dissenting)
(noting that the reason for the racial gerrymander was that a more compact minori-
ty district elsewhere in the state would have displaced the incumbent).
1998] 751
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tional violations. The Court summarily upheld the 1982 Act in
1984, 4 but Flores implied the opposite result.
Many provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196446
go beyond the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. As ap-
plied to state and local governments, all of these provisions de-
pend on the 1972 Amendments, which extended Title VII to gov-
ernment employment.47 Congress expressly rested this exten-
sion on the enforcement power, and the Court upheld the exten-
sion based on the enforcement power.48
The Constitution forbids only deliberate or overt discrimina-
tion in employment.49 But Title VII requires employers to justi-
fy practices with disparate impact on women or minorities by
showing "job related[ness]" and "business necessity."" The ex-
tension of disparate impact provisions to state and local employ-
ment required government justification for many facially neutral
employment practices adopted with no hint of bad motive, in-
cluding civil service examinations and size and strength require-
ments.51 Perhaps there are jurisdictions that designed civil ser-
vice requirements to exclude minority employees, but the domi-
nant history is quite different: merit appointment emerged as
part of a great reform designed to eliminate serious abuses in
patronage appointments.52 There was much lengthy litigation
over the disparate impact of governmental employment systems,
but I do not know that any state or local government ever found
it worthwhile to challenge Congress's power to require
governmental employers to justify that disparate impact. Con-
gressional power to go beyond the Constitution was not a serious
45. See Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984);
see also Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the
1982 Amendments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (1994).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b), (h).
48. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976) (citing committee reports).
49. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
51. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445 (1982) (examination); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (height and weight).
52. See RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 12-41 (1994).
752 [Vol. 39:743
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issue in the 1970s, but it is after Flores.
Disparate impact rules in government employment might be
upheld, not as a remedy for discrimination in employment, but
as a remedy for discrimination in public education. As in its ex-
planation of Morgan, this would require the Court to say that a
remedy in one area of state activity is congruent with a violation
in another, to take judicial notice of the education violations,
and to ignore what Congress actually said, which was that em-
ployment requirements have disparate racial impact "because of
low incomes, substandard housing, poor education, and other
'atypical' environmental experiences"St-the whole range of so-
cial disadvantage, and not just the part attributable to unconsti-
tutional discrimination by government agencies.
The Court has held that pregnancy discrimination is not sex
discrimination and that it violates neither the Constitution'
nor Title VII." Congress promptly responded with corrective
legislation, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,56 that redefined
sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. The Act
expands on the Court's constitutional definition of sex discrimi-
nation, and it applies to state and local governments, in their ca-
pacity as employers, a rule that goes well beyond the constitu-
tional rule in Geduldig v. Aiello.57
There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act is congruent with and proportionate to any
constitutional violations as the Court defines them. Congress did
not purport to find that discrimination based on pregnancy is
widely used as a pretext to exclude women. Rather, it found that
pregnancy discrimination unnecessarily burdens women.5" But
so far as I am aware no state or local government ever chal-
lenged the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. By 1978, congres-
53. H.R. REP. No. 92-238 at 20-21 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2156.
54. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
55. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
57. The Court reasoned that pregnancy discrimination distinguishes between "preg-
nant women and non-pregnant persons," and that the second group "includes mem-
bers of both sexes." Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
58. See H. REP. No. 95-948, at 2-3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749,
4750-51.
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sional power to go beyond judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion seemed so settled that such a challenge must have looked
futile.
The disparate treatment provisions of Title VII" require em-
ployers to use sexually integrated actuarial tables.0 The Court
has never held that the Constitution requires that result, and
the current Court seems unlikely to do so. Few critics of tradi-
tional insurance practice have claimed that employers acted out
of a bad motive in these cases, or that the ban on sex-segregated
actuarial tables was a prophylactic rule to avoid some other vio-
lation. Instead, the statute strikes a different balance than the
Constitution as judicially interpreted between competing inter-
ests in sexual equality and in traditional insurance practice.
Requiring the use of sexually integrated actuarial tables was
a far more substantive exercise of Section 5 power than RFRA.
It produced fierce litigation by government insurance plans, in-
cluding a trip to the Supreme Court on whether employers could
escape the civil rights laws by providing insurance benefits
through a third party contractor.6 But the economic interests
that found it worthwhile to make that argument did not find it
worthwhile to challenge congressional use of the enforcement
power to go beyond judicially defined constitutional rights.
The Civil Rights Act of 186662 forbids private discrimination
in the making of contracts and transfer of property. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.," the Court upheld this provision as an
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, recognizing that Congress has the power "rationally to
determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery.'
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
60. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074-75 (1983); City
of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-18 (1978). See generally Lea Brilmayer
et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and De-
mographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980) (explaining why the civil rights
model of nondiscrimination overrides the fundamentally inconsistent insurance model
of nondiscrimination).
61. See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1074-75.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1982 (1994).
63. 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
64. Id. at 440; accord Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05
754 [Vol. 39:743
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Here Congress explicitly redefined the substantive scope of pro-
tection--"determining" for itself the badges and incidents of
slavery. The Court has held unanimously that congressional
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment "extend[s] far be-
yond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude." ' But judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment does not go at all beyond actual imposition of involuntary
servitude. The Court has said that the amendment "does not
in other matters protect the individual rights of persons of the
negro race."66 If congressional power to enforce constitutional
rights is merely remedial in the sense in which Flores used the
word, then Congress cannot have power to define the badges
and incidents of slavery.
The Civil Rights Act of 19917 forbids private discrimination
in the enforcement and administration of contracts. 68 This
provision amended the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and presum-
ably is based on the same constitutional power. This provision
goes as far beyond the Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment as did the 1866 Act, and the 1991 Act's constitu-
tionality apparently has been assumed on the basis of deci-
sions upholding the 1866 Act.
There are other examples of enforcement statutes that ex-
ceed the scope of judicially defined constitutional rights, 9 but
these are the most important. There seems to be a widespread
impression that RFRA is somehow uniquely different from
these statutes. But no one has ever explained the differ-
ence-not the Court in its opinion and not the City of Boerne
in its brief. RFRA is condemned as broad,70 intrusive,7' dis-
(1971); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that Congress has the
"power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery"); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989)
(unanimously reaffirming the statutory holding in Runyon).
65. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 105 (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994)).
66. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
67. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
69. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
70. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997) ("[RFRA] is broader
than is appropriate.").
71. See id. at 2170 ("[Slweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of
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proportionate,72 and substantive,75 but no one ever completes
the comparison and explains how these other statutes are nar-
row, unintrusive, proportionate, or remedial under the same
criteria.
These other statutes are not narrow or unintrusive. Some
apply to all public employment in the country, and others apply
to all voting in the country. Unlike RFRA, these statutes do not
merely require occasional exemptions from state policies that
remain generally enforceable; rather, these statutes fundamen-
tally changed voting and employment systems. These statutes
intrude far more deeply than RFRA into the core processes of
state and local government. Opponents of RFRA argue that part
of RFRA's problem is that it enacts a broad standard for courts
to apply in individual cases. But this is equally true of the Vot-
ing Rights Act definition of discriminatory results and the Title
VII provisions on disparate impact.74
Before Mores, the only enforcement act struck down in mod-
ern times was the congressional effort to lower the voting age to
eighteen. The Court struck down this act in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell v7 on the grounds that the Constitution expressly leaves vot-
ing eligibility to the states except with respect to race, sex, and
payment of a poll tax,76 and that in any event there was no evi-
dence of discrimination against persons aged eighteen to twenty-
one.77 If any statute reached far enough to raise unique prob-
government . . ").
72. See id. ("RFRA is so out of proportion ... .
73. See id. ("[RFRA] attempt[s] a substantive change ...
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (regulating every "voting qualification or prereq-
uisite to voting or standard, practice or procedure"); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (reg-
ulating all "political processes leading to nomination or election," "based on the total-
ity of the circumstances"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (regulating any "employment
practice that causes a disparate impact").
75. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
76. See id. at 119-26 (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court) (relying on
Article I, § 2); id. at 293-94 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J.) (relying on "the explicit provisions of Article
I, Article II, and the Seventeenth Amendment"); id. at 152-213 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (reviewing the legislative history at great length
to show that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to voting qualifications).
77. See id. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J.) (noting that persons aged 18 to 21 are not a "dis-
crete and insular minority"); id. at 212 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
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lems of congressional power, then it was this one. Even so, it
was struck down by only five to four.78 The five in the majority
joined later that same Term in two opinions--one holding and
one dictum-recognizing that congressional power may sweep
far beyond judicial interpretation of the right being enforced.79
Those were race cases, and Dan Conkle has suggested that
Congress has less power with respect to religion than with re-
spect to African Americans." But Congress has not confined
Enforcement Clause legislation to protection of freed slaves and
their descendants. These statutes extend to Cubans,81 Jews,82
Arabs, s and Puerto Ricans--even under legislation to en-
force the Thirteenth Amendment. They extend to sex discrimina-
tion and pregnancy discrimination, even though Congress con-
sciously refused to prohibit sex discrimination in the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The Court in Flores reaffirmed congressional
power to enforce rights incorporated by the Due Process Clause,
and it gave no hint that this power is more limited than the
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.8 If race or incor-
poration is the distinction, the Court did not say so.
One possible distinction between RFRA and other enforcement
acts is that, except for the Voting Rights Acts, all of these other
ened with unconstitutional discrimination); id. at 127 (Black, J., announcing judg-
ment of the Court) (denying that Congress could "prohibit every discrimination be-
tween groups of people").
78. See id, at 135-44 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.) (dissenting from the deci-
sion to invalidate the voting-age statute); id. at 239-81 (Brennan, White, & Marshall,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from the decision to inval-
idate the voting-age statute).
79. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (holding that Congress
may reach private conduct far beyond the actual imposition of slavery in legislation
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227
(1971) (suggesting that Congress could pass a law under the Enforcement Clause of
the Thirteenth Amendment to prevent a city from closing its swimming pools to
avoid desegregation).
80. See Conkle, supra note 22, at 68-70.
81. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
82. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
83. See Saint Francis College v. Al-KhazrAji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
84. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
85. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161-63.
86. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2163-64 (1997).
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statutes could be reenacted under the Commerce Clause. So
they could, at least for now, and so could much of RFRA. But
this is only a partial solution practically, and no solution con-
ceptually. It is a partial solution practically because back pay
and damages would be unavailable against states and state
agencies if any of this legislation were based on the Commerce
Clause,87 and because some applications of RFRA are beyond
the likely boundaries of the Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause is no solution conceptually because it
leaves the enforcement power either shrunken or subject to a
welter of conflicting interpretations. If the law now is that
Congress can protect liberty pursuant to its power to protect
commerce, but not pursuant to its power to enforce constitu-
tional rights, then this conundrum reveals a fundamental error
in the Court's approach to the Constitution. How can Congress
have more power to regulate the states under the Commerce
Clause than under the Fourteenth Amendment? How can Con-
gress have more power to protect commerce in bricks than to
protect places of worship, and more power to protect sales of
barbecue sauce than to protect racial equality?88 The answer
may lie in the most fundamental of the disagreements between
the parties in Flores.
III. FEDERALISM AND THE CIVIL WAR
Pores was ultimately a case about the meaning of the Civil
War. The War and Reconstruction Amendments made a revolu-
tion in the most literal sense of that word: fundamental struc-
tural and constitutional change imposed by force of arms. The
War and the amendments made the federal government re-
sponsible for the protection of liberty in the states.89
87. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996) (holding that the
Commerce Clause does not confer power to override Eleventh Amendment immunity,
but Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does).
88. See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the public
accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to Ollie's Barbecue).
89. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 141-43 (1990).
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In the antebellum view of liberty, liberty meant the relative
absence of government, and a strong central government was
the greatest threat to liberty." But by the end of the war the
federal government had committed itself to end slavery,"'
which nearly half the states still bitterly defended. Given that
alignment, it could no longer be denied that the states were
the greatest threat to liberty and that liberty required a cen-
tral government strong enough to protect liberty from the
states.92 The winners insisted on constitutional amendments
to protect liberty in the states, and the amendments charged
Congress with enforcing the new protections." This was a
fundamental structural change; Congress now bore primary re-
sponsibility for liberty in the states.
For RFRA's supporters, there is no doubt that this responsi-
bility for liberty included responsibility for freedom of speech
and freedom of religion. The slave states had repeatedly violat-
ed both freedoms, and congressmen repeatedly cited these
violations as examples of the need for federal intervention.94
The lead sponsor in each house, in the principal speech intro-
ducing and explaining the Fourteenth Amendment, said that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
began with the Bill of Rights, and that Congress would now
have power to enforce those rights.95 No one denied it at the
time, and the great bulk of careful historical work confirms
that incorporation went at least far enough to include the First
Amendment.96
90. See id. at 131-33.
91. See, e.g., id. at 124-30; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34-35 (1986).
92. See MCPHERSON, supra note 89, at 136-38.
93. See id. at 140-43.
94. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1131-37,
1145-49 (1994).
95. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard); id. at 1088-90 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
96. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE COURT 42 (6th
ed. 1994); CURTIS, supra note 91; HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94 (1908); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 258-59 (1990);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1198-260 (1992). Even Charles Fairman, the premier source for the view that
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But revolutions beget counterrevolutions, and vigorous enforce-
ment of the Reconstruction Amendments was short lived. The
counterrevolution was in full flower by the middle 1870s97 after
the Democrats swept the congressional elections and the Grant
administration quit responding to electoral violence in the
South." The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment created no new rights except the right to racial equality,s9
and then that none of the new amendments empowered the Unit-
ed States to prosecute members of a private military that massa-
cred black citizens in a fight to control a local government.'
Counterrevolutions are always partial. The Freedmen were
not reenslaved, and the Reconstruction Amendments were not
repealed. The Court often interpreted those amendments nar-
rowly, but sometimes it gave them real content and enforced
that content. The Court announced a broad and deferential stan-
dard for reviewing congressional legislation under the enforce-
ment clauses,'0 ' and its narrow applications of that standard
mostly involved congressional attempts to dispense with the
state action requirement." 2 Whatever the merit of those deci-
incorporation was not intended, accepted selective incorporation, including incorpo-
ration of the Free Speech Clause on grounds equally applicable to the religion claus-
es. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138-39 (1949); see also
JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
223 (1951) (concluding that the Amendment made natural law rights binding on the
states, and that only some of these rights were listed in the Bill of Rights); Howard
Jay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 19-20
n.80 (1954) (arguing that substantial selective incorporation was uncontroversial, but
that there was no intent either way on full incorporation). Alfred Avins, a strict
originalist who took a minimalist view of what the amendments did for racial equal-
ity, nonetheless concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause effected full in-
corporation. See Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-
Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968).
97. See MCPHERSON, supra note 89, at 145-52.
98. See id. at 148-49, 152; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil
Rights During the First Reconstruction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155 (1995) (describing
the rise and fall of civil rights enforcement during Reconstruction).
99. See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
100. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
101. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 311-12 (1879); Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
102. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 542;
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sions, they should not affect RFRA, which was directed only to
state action.0 3
The Civil War had forever changed expectations for the feder-
al government. The American people looked to it for more and
more of their governmental needs and repeatedly expanded its
powers. Before the Civil War, eleven constitutional amendments
restricted federal power,' and none expanded federal power.
After the Civil War, nine constitutional amendments expanded
federal power or reduced state influence over the federal govern-
ment.0 5 Only one contracted federal power, and that amend-
ment-the only such amendment since 1798-merely repealed
the ill-fated experiment of Prohibition.'
In the era of Lochner v. New York," 7 the Supreme Court put
the Fourteenth Amendment to the service of industrial capital-
ism-another big winner in the Civil War, but not the
amendment's intended beneficiary. After 1937, the Court led
another push to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments with
respect to noneconomic liberties.0 8 With respect to racial
equality, the executive and legislative branches eventually added
their weight to the effort, beginning in 1957, when President
Eisenhower sent troops to Little Rock.0 9 The Court reinvigo-
rated the surviving Reconstruction legislation," and upheld
new civil rights legislation under the Commerce Clause and the
Enforcement Clauses."' As already noted, congressional en-
see also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (holding that power to enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment did not extend to voting restrictions unrelated to race).
103. RFRA applied only to actions of a "government," defined as any person acting
"under color of law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994).
104. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XI.
105. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XIX, XXIV, XXVI. The Seventeenth Amendment,
which provided for direct election of Senators, is the one that reduced state influence
without formally expanding federal power.
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
107. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
108. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
109. For histories of the Little Rock crisis, see TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK
CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984); ROY REED, FAUBUS: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PRODIGAL 181-239 (1997).
110. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
111. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
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forcement legislation that reached beyond judicial interpretation
of the amendment to be enforced was frequent and apparently
uncontroversial by the 1970s.
This push to redeem the revolution of the 1860s of course pro-
duced its own reaction, partially redeeming the counterrevolu-
tion of the 1870s. Both the revolutionary and counterrevolution-
ary waves were shallower this time; perhaps because of that,
they were also longer lived. Conflicting forces coexist, creating
uncertainty and shifts of direction. Since 1971, the Supreme
Court has been divided. It has generally slowed the expansion of
federal rights, and sometimes rolled back those rights, but it has
also dropped such bombshells as Roe v. Wade... and Romer v.
Evans,"' creating new federal rights and expanding them far
beyond anything imagined by the most radical member of the
Thirty-ninth Congress.
No one wants to go back to the 1870s on race, but powerful
forces want to go back very far indeed on federalism. The more
outspoken opponents of RFRA were committed to a sweeping
counterrevolution. Their model of federalism is from 1787, or
1791. It is as if the Civil War never happened. Professor Hamil-
ton argued that Congress is the great threat to religious liberty,
and that the constitutional evidence for this proposition is the
First Amendment."" Questions of religious liberty, she asserts,
should be left to the states, because the Framers of the First
Amendment saw Congress as the threat."5 The unspoken
premise, essential for the argument to make any sense, is that
nothing has happened since 1791 to change that perception.
Jeffrey Sutton, appearing for Ohio, put it even more succinctly
at the oral argument, urging the Court to "respect the Jefferso-
nian vision for this country. Let the States be the principal bul-
383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a federal constitutional right to abortion).
113. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating a state provision preventing state or local
laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
114. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
Into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 357, 362-63 (1994).
115. See id.
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wark when it comes to protecting civil liberties.""6 This in a
case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment! One
could scarcely imagine a "vision" more alien to the Fourteenth
Amendment than "the [sitates [as] the principal bulwark when
it comes to protecting civil liberties.""'
Speaking across this conceptual chasm, the two sides found
each other incomprehensible. One side thought the Civil War
and the amendments fundamentally changed the structure of
federalism; the other side interpreted the amendments in a way
that was faithful to 1787. The rapid succession of revolution and
counterrevolution in the' 1860s and 1870s left both sides with
talking points from history. The debate over the meaning of the
Civil War, or from another perspective, the struggle to secure
the fruits of the Civil War, can continue forever.
IV. CONGRESS AND THE COURT
Supposing that the Reconstruction Amendments did make the
federal government responsible for liberty in the states, the par-
ties also fundamentally disagreed over how the Constitution dis-
tributed that power among the branches. But on this issue, the
two sides reversed the customary political polarity: the defend-
ers of states' rights became the defenders of judicial supremacy.
The anti-RFRA forces said that the primary federal power under
the Fourteenth Amendment is vested in the Court, and that the
congressional power is merely derivative. Congress's power to
enforce the Constitution, under this argument, is only the power
to enforce judicial interpretation of the Constitution. The Consti-
tution is what the judges say it is-no more and no less."8 The
anti-RFRA position combines an antebellum version of federal-
ism with a 1960s version of judicial supremacy.
The reversal of positions on judicial supremacy is not so sur-
prising, because these positions answered a question that had
also been reversed from its usual formulation. The judicial pow-
116. Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Boerne v. Fores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)
(No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 87109, at *29 (Feb. 19, 1997).
117. Id.
118. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
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er asserted in Flores is not the Marbury v. Madison"' power to
decide cases and controversies,2 ° but rather, the claim of Coo-
per v. Aaron 2' that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the ex-
position of the law of the Constitution."'22 Cooper was right on
its facts, but it does not entirely capture what Flores asserts. In
both Marbury and Cooper, the Court restricted the discretion of
the states or political branches.' s Of course, the target of these
restrictions must be bound if there is to be judicial review at all.
Employment Division v. Smith"4 presented the opposite sce-
nario; it expanded the discretion of the states and political
branches. It does not undercut the Court's role to say that the
states and political branches need not use the whole range of
this expanded discretion or that they need not go as. far in bur-
dening constitutional interests as the Court allows them to go.
But Flores says that when the Court expands the discretion of
the states and the political branches, the political branches of
the federal government are bound by the expansion of state
power. Marbury and Cooper imply that the Court sets a floor
under the liberties of the American people that no political offi-
cial can violate. With respect to federal protections of liberty in
the states, Flores holds that the Court sets both the floor and
the ceiling.
This was another chasm separating opponents who could
barely comprehend each other's position. The issue first received
widespread attention in Katzenbach v. Morgan," in which the
Court said that Congress's power to expand on judicial interpre-
tation of constitutional rights did not imply any power to "re-
strict, abrogate, or dilute" those rights.'26 For RFRA's oppo-
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
120. See id. at 178.
121. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
122. Id. at 18.
123. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12-16 (enforcing the rule that states cannot operate
racially segregated schools); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80 (holding that Con-
gress cannot vest original mandamus jurisdiction in the Supreme Court). Marbury
did not protect individual liberty, but it did restrict congressional power, which is
the relevant structural distinction.
124. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
125. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
126. Id. at 651 n.10.
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nents, this was an ipse dixit, an incomprehensible one-time
anomaly-Justice Brennan at his worst.'27  For RFRA's
supporters, this was an uncontroversial corollary of Marbury v.
Madison, affirming the power of judicial review. Whether the
enforcement power gave Congress authority to go further than
the Court in protecting constitutional rights had no implications
for whether the enforcement power gave Congress the power to
roll back the Court's interpretation of constitutional rights. Con-
gress could not violate judicially announced rights pursuant to
the Enforcement Clause any more than it could do so pursuant
to the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause. What was obvi-
ous to RFRA's supporters was incomprehensible to the Chief
Justice, who, when offered this explanation at oral argument,
said simply, "I don't understand that at all." 8
Judicial supremacy to set both the floor and the ceiling on
federal rights in the states does not reflect the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress did not entrust the
fruits of the Civil War to the unchecked discretion of the Court
that decided Dred Scott v. Sanford," whose Justices were ap-
pointed by Andrew Johnson. It is the worst sort of anachronism
to read an expansion of Cooper v. Aaron"' into the judicial and
political climate of 1866. The amendments vested independent
responsibility for enforcing the new rights in both Congress and
the courts. The grant of legislative power was to enforce the new
rights "by appropriate legislation," tracking the language of
McCulloch v. Maryland."' Each enforcement clause is a neces-
sary and proper clause to the underlying right, and, if it mat-
ters, each enforcement clause is itself augmented by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause of Article .32
127. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Im-
plications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5, 32-33 (1995);
Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 130-32 (1996); Hamilton, supra note 114, at 389.
128. Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)
(No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 87109, at *49 (Feb. 19, 1997).
129. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
130. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
131. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have power ... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
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Senators and representatives argued that Congress needed
the enforcement power because judges might not enforce the
new Amendments. 13' They argued that the courts had not en-
forced the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV."
They also argued that the enforcement power would add nothing
if it were confined to the judicially enforceable meaning of the
Amendment."5 They urged in strong terms that Congress must
be the judge of what legislation was "appropriate" to enforce the
Amendments. 13 6 They emphasized that Congress had power to
do whatever was necessary and proper to enforce the end, object,
spirit, or principles of the Amendments. 7
Congress repeatedly acted on these views. Throughout Recon-
struction, Congress enacted legislation that went well beyond the
literal language of the Reconstruction Amendments and beyond
any judicial interpretation ever offered, then or later. Most obvi-
ously, Congress repeatedly dispensed with proof of state action. 38
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States.") (emphasis added).
133. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 229 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Boreman); id., 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3568 (1870) (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at
3654-55 (statement of Sen. Howard).
134. See id., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at
1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 1054 (statement of Rep. Higby); id.
at 2961 (statement of Sen. Poland).
135. See 2 CONG. REc. 4085 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter); CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872) (statement of Sen. Morton); id. at 762 (statement of
Sen. Carpenter); 42d Cong.,. 1st Sess. 375 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe).
136. See 2 CONG. REC. app. at 358 (1874) (statement of Sen. Morton); CONG.
GLOBE, id., 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner); id., 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1871) (statement of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 393 (statement of
Rep. Smith of New York); id. at 482-83 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id. app. at 70
(statement of Rep. Shellabarger); id., 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1867) (statement of
Rep. Kasson); id., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); id.
at 1118 (statement of Rep. Wilson).
137. See 2 CONG. REc. app. at 358 (1874) (statement of Sen. Morton); CONG. GLOBE
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 761 (1872) (statement of Sen. Carpenter); id., 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 375 (1871) (statement of Rep. Lowe); id., 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3563 (1870)
(statement of Sen. Carpenter); id., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull).
138. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 1982 (1994) (forbidding
private discrimination with respect to contracts and property); Civil Rights Act of
1871 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (forbidding private conspiracies to deprive any class of
persons of equal rights); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (surviv-
ing section now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994)) (forbidding private conspiracies to
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Ultimately, it was impossible to protect against the risk that
the Court would eviscerate the amendments by hostile interpre-
tation. Short of explicitly precluding judicial review of Enforce-
ment Clause measures, the drafters of the amendments could
not prevent the Court from interpreting the enforcement clauses
as narrowly as the Court interpreted the underlying rights. The
most Congress could do was put an additional check on such in-
terpretation by forcing the Court to make two separate deci-
sions. Congress could force the Court to hold, first, that the Con-
stitution of its own force does not protect a claimed right, and
second, that it is beyond the power of Congress to create the
claimed right by appropriate legislation. To an extent that re-
mains to be determined, Fores collapsed the two questions: a
decision limiting a constitutional right automatically limits the
enforcement power.
V. SUBSTANCE, REMEDY, AND PROPORTIONALITY
RFRA's opponents, and now the Court, say that the enforce-
ment power is remedial and not substantive.'39 On this theory,
the Court defines the substance of constitutional rights. Con-
gress provides only remedies, and only for violations of the
rights defined by the Court. 40 This distinction was barely
mentioned in prior opinions of the Court. Instead, prior dissent-
ing Justices drew this distinction, repeatedly complaining that
the Court's decisions erroneously recognized congressional en-
forcement power as substantive.'
I am not sure what the bulk of RFRA's supporters thought of
this distinction. My own view may have been idiosyncratic; I
have written two books on Remedies, and I have taught
violate federal rights); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (sections 1 and
2 declared unconstitutional as applied in the states by the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) and its application in places under the exclusive control of the federal
government held not severable in Butts v. Merchants & Miners Trans. Co., 230 U.S.
126 (1913)) (forbidding private discrimination in places of public accommodation).
139. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2167 (1997).
140. See id. at 2164.
141. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 219-21 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCI, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
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Remedies for more than twenty years. I found the distinction
incoherent.
The ordinary meaning of "remedial" would be legislation that
provides a remedy for a judicially determined violation. Some
enforcement legislation is of this sort; it authorizes causes of
action, damages, injunctions, and criminal penalties. 43 No
plaintiff can obtain one of these statutory remedies without
proving a substantive violation as defined by the Court. But the
past statutes on which we relied are not of this type. These
statutes enable plaintiffs to prove a statutory violation without
ever showing anything that the Court would recognize as a con-
stitutional violation. If there be any sense in which these stat-
utes are remedial, then it seemed to me that RFRA was remedi-
al in the same sense. I thought it was settled that Congress
could dispense with proof of bad motive or overt discrimina-
tion,'" and I did not care whether the Court called that sub-
stantive or remedial.
The ordinary meaning of "substantive" would be legislation
that defines a statutory violation in some way different from the
Court's definition of a constitutional violation. But a vast rafige
of possible legislation is substantive in this sense, from dispens-
ing with proof of defendant's state of mind to dispensing with
every element of the judicial conception of the constitutional
right and substituting a wholly different and unrelated set of
elements. RFRA's opponents seemed to assume that all substan-
tive uses of the enforcement power would be indistinguish-
able-that if Congress could enact any one substantive provi-
sion, then it could enact any imaginable substantive provision.
That was the fallacy of the excluded middle. But it was also the
consequence of trying to analyze the problem with two such ill-
fitting categories.
There are many more plausible ways to limit the enforcement
power. Michael McConnell has suggested asking whether the
(2d ed. 1994); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE
(1991).
143. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (providing for criminal punishment for depri-
vation of federal rights under color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing
civil liability for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law).
144. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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congressional interpretation of the right is fairly arguable; 45
that Congress has adopted an interpretation once adopted by the
Court would be powerful evidence that the interpretation is at
least arguable.
In Archbishop Flores's brief, we suggested conceptual and cat-
egorical limits. 14 6 I thought the Court should ask which ele-
ments of the judicially defined right Congress could change, and,
secondarily, ask how far each element could be changed. For
example, it seemed settled that Congress could dispense with
proof of motive,'47 and nearly settled that Congress could not
dispense with proof of state action 48 in legislation not based
145. See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court-Comment: Institutions and In-
terpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 172-73
(1997).
146. See Brief of Respondent Flores, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997) (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 10293, at *23-29.
147. See Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984)
(mem.) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1982); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
445-51 (1982) (applying disparate impact provisions of Title VII to state employ-
ment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477 (1980) (plurality opinion) (summa-
rizing Oregon v. Mitchell); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-83
(1980) (upholding preclearance provisions of Voting Rights Act of 1965); Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970) (Black, J., announcing judgment of the Court);
id. at 144-47 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 231-36 (Brennan, White, & Marshall, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J.) (upholding unani-
mously a nationwide ban on literacy tests); Gaston County v. United States, 395
U.S. 285 (1969) (upholding a ban on literacy tests); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966) (upholding a ban on English language literacy tests as applied to Puerto
Rican voters); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding a ban
on literacy tests); James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-60 (1924)
(upholding the Supplemental Prohibition Act making it unnecessary to prove that
beer was intended for "beverage purposes").
148. See United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830-33 (1983) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1985 protects First Amendment rights only against action under
color of law); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 135-39 (1903) (holding that an act to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment cannot reach private action); The Civil Rights Cas-
es, 109 U.S. 3, 10-19 (1883) (holding that an act to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment can reach only state action); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
554-55 (1876) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees rights only as
against the state). But see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8
(1973) (stating in dictum that Congress may "proscribe purely private conduct under
§ 5"); Griffn v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971) (reserving the issue of state
action); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring,
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on the Thirteenth Amendment. There is much to be said for and
against this distinction between the motive and state action
requirements.' But once the distinction is drawn, it produces
two clear rules. If Mores had announced and followed these ap-
parent rules, then everybody would know that Congress could
dispense with proof of motive and that it could not dispense with
proof of state action. Similar rules could then be developed for
other elements of a constitutional violation.
Instead, Mores gave us a test of congruence and proportionali-
ty,5 based on the Court's view of whether the statute was neces-
sary. 5 ' Under this rule, sometimes Congress can dispense with
proof of motive or overt discrimination, and sometimes it cannot. A
statute that dispenses with proof of a substantive element of a
constitutional violation is sometimes substantive and sometimes
remedial. The difference apparently depends on whether the
Court thinks there are enough cases of unconstitutionality to justi-
fy dispensing with complete proof of unconstitutionality.'52 If
there are enough such cases, then dispensing with proof is remedi-
al-a way of getting at real cases of unconstitutionality. If there
are not enough such cases, then dispensing with proof is substan-
tive; it changes the rules to reach other cases. Deciding how many
cases of unconstitutionality are enough would seem to be a legisla-
tive judgment, but Mores makes it a judicial question. For the first
time since 1937, the Court is second-guessing Congress on ques-
tions of degree in the interpretation of delegated powers.
joined by Black & Fortas, JJ.); id. at 781-84 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J., & Douglas, J.) (stating that Congress can
enact legislation aimed at private conspiracies to interfere with Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664-66 (1884) (upholding Fifteenth
Amendment power to punish private violence to prevent voting in federal election).
149. Motive is often hard to prove but state action is not. The state action require-
ment is textually explicit, and motive requirements are implied judicially. The state
action requirement is structurally central to the purpose of the amendments and to
the division of authority between states and the federal government; it is hard to
make the same claims about motive. But holding that Congress cannot dispense
with proof of state action is almost certainly inconsistent with the original under-
standing.
150. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164, 2169 (1997).
151. See id. at 2169 (stating that "RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of mod-
ern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry").
152. See id.
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United States v. Lopez 53 moved in that direction, but Mores
makes the move much more definitively. Arguably, Lopez simply
defined a limit to Congress's power: a criminal offense defined
under the Commerce Clause, that has no economic or commer-
cial transaction as an element of the offense, is either invalid
per se or faces an unusual burden of justification.M No such
limited explanation is possible for Mores. "Proportionality" is in-
herently a question of degree.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS UNDER SMITH
Even if one accepts the Court's view that the Constitution con-
fines the enforcement power to remedies that are proportionate to
judicially defined violations of the Constitution, that should not
end the inquiry. Whether RFRA was remedially proportionate
depended on how many constitutional violations existed to be
remedied. That, in turn, depended on facts not in the record and
on what counts as a constitutional violation. I think that there are
many constitutional violations, even under Smith; RFRA's oppo-
nents think that there are very few.'55 This disagreement is
partly due to disagreement about the frequency of religious bias.
But it is mostly due to an unresolved ambiguity about the mean-
ing of Employment Division v. Smith.'56
Smith allows neutral and generally applicable laws to interfere
with the free exercise of religion; laws that are not neutral and
generally applicable are subject to strict scrutiny. '5 This is not a
motive test; it is a test of objectively differential treatment. Smith
says that if a regulation allows individualized exceptions for secu-
lar hardship, there must be a compelling reason to refuse excep-
tions for religious hardship.'58 The religious claimant need not
prove an antireligious motive for refusing religious exceptions.
153. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
154. See id. at 565-68.
155. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
156. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
157. See id. at 876-90; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-46 (1993) (applying and elaborating the rule).
158. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
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In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,59 the Court applied the same reasoning to broad cat-
egorical exceptions such as fishing and pest control. 6 ' "Catego-
ries of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the
incidental effect of burdening religious practice." 6' Part of the
Lukumi opinion was based on the City's motive, but that part
received only two votes.'62 The ordinances in Lukumi were in-
valid because they gave less favorable treatment to religious
killings of animals than to secular killings of animals and to
other secular activities that caused similar harms, not because a
majority of the Court found an antireligious motive.'" Lack of
general applicability need not be nearly so egregious as in
Lukumi to be unconstitutional. The Court said that "these ordi-
nances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to pro-
tect First Amendment rights.""6
If the standard is lack of general applicability, then many stat-
utes violate Smith and Lukumi. Federal, state, and local laws are
full of exceptions for influential secular interests. Moreover, the
details of federal, state, and local laws are frequently filled in
through individualized processes that provide ample opportunity
to exempt favored interests and refuse exemptions to less favored
interests, often including religious practice. Where a law has
secular exceptions or an individualized exemption process, any
burden on religion requires compelling justification under a rea-
sonable interpretation of Smith and Lukumi.'65
The problem, of course, is that these violations are difficult to
litigate. There is room for endless argument whether the secular
exception is really analogous to the claimed religious exception
and whether the law-making and exemption process is really
individualized. Only probing discovery can reveal the discretion-
ary exemptions informally granted by enforcement personnel. In
159. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
160. Id. at 543-44.
161. Id. at 542.
162. See id. at 540-42. Only Justice Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in Part II-A-2
of the opinion. See id. at 522 (syllabus).
163. See id. at 533-40, 542-46.
164. Id. at 543.
165. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 543-45; Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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the very best case, future free exercise litigation will be far more
complicated and expensive, and many good claims will be lost.
In the more likely case, courts will defer to regulators and only
the most egregious violations will ever be adjudicated.
In the view of RFRA's opponents, objective differences in
treatment do not require compelling justification unless they are
motivated by hostility to the burdened religion or to religion in
general. If the Smith-Lukumi standard requires an antireligious
motive, then there are fewer violations, which are even harder
to prove, but they still happen in substantial numbers.
Most of the violations with bad motive arise from administra-
tive decisions by bureaucrats, not from the passage of legisla-
tion. Much of the population is hostile to high-intensity religious
views. In 1993, 45% of Americans admitted to "mostly unfavor-
able" or "very unfavorable" opinions of "religious fundamental-
ists," and 86% admitted to mostly or very unfavorable opinions
of "members of religious cults or sects."66 In 1989, 30% of
Americans said they would not like to have "religious fundamen-
talists" as neighbors, and 62% said they would not like to have
"members of minority religious sects or cults" as neighbors.'67
By contrast, only 12% admitted that they would not like to have
"blacks" as neighbors. 6 '
It is a reasonable inference that at least a comparable per-
centage of government administrators hold similarly hostile
views toward religious fundamentalists and members of minori-
ty sects. In fact, the proportion of hostile government adminis-
trators is probably higher, because it is the experience of many
believers that these hostile attitudes are more common among
persons in elite positions. If 45% or more of government admin-
istrators hold unfavorable opinions about religious fundamental-
ists and members of minority sects, and if these administrators
have broad discretion to deal with persons subject to their au-
thority, then it follows that half or more of discretionary admin-
istrative decisions about the religious practices of these minori-
166. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1993, at 75-76, 78
(1994).
167. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1989, at 63, 76-77
(1990).
168. Id. at 67.
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ties are infected by these hostile attitudes. If all the facts were
known and provable, administrative action so motivated would
generally violate the Free Exercise Clause even under the nar-
rowest reading of Smith.
Of course RFRA's supporters did not testify to Congress that
Smith still covered large numbers of free exercise violations.
They said that nearly all laws are neutral and generally applica-
ble and that Smith had all but repealed the Free Exercise
Clause.6 ' My own testimony in those hearings avoided the
worst of this rhetoric, but I did not contradict the general im-
pression. I pointed to a range of motivations for government
burdens on religion, some of which would violate Smith and
some of which would not.' But I did not talk about objectively
differential treatment, or less-than-general applicability, without
regard to motive. I had already written that "the requirement
that religious conduct get the benefit of secular exemptions is a
requirement of broad potential application."' But I did not
tell Congress that.
The Court used this legislative record against RFRA. It in-
ferred that Congress believed that few statutes violate Smith in
America today.72 In the Court's view, the hearing record
showed that even Congress believed that the proportion of con-
stitutional violations to RFRA violations would be small. 3 In
the Court's view, it followed that Congress was not interested in
facilitating the proof of Smith violations but rather in reaching
conduct that even Congress did not believe violated the Consti-
tution as interpreted in Smith.' 4
169. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 155 (attachment to statement of
Michael P. Farris, President, Home School Legal Defense Association) (stating that
Smith "virtually eliminated the opportunity for religious persons to claim that any
government action violates their right to freely exercise their religion"); id. at 176-77
(statement of Nadine Strossen, President, and Robert S. Peck, Legislative Council,
American Civil Liberties Union) (stating that Smith "wrote the First Amendment's
guarantee of the 'free exercise of religion' out of the Constitution").
170. See id. at 68-76 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, University
of Texas).
171. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 50.
172. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997).
173. See id.
174. See id.
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RFRA's supporters largely shaped this legislative record; we
are partly to blame for our own difficulties. There are many
reasons why RFRA's supporters made the arguments in the way
we did. Most obviously, we were engaged in the familiar practice
of all causes seeking legislative relief-we portrayed the problem
in its worst possible light to maximize the need for legislative
action. For reasons stated below, this portrayal was accurate at
the time;75 it was also politically expedient. No one foresaw
that this portrayal would have constitutional significance be-
cause the Court had yet to decide Flores or any case like it. For
two decades, Congress had passed unchallenged statutes to
expand on the Supreme Court's narrow interpretations of consti-
tutional rights. It had routinely acted both on the ground that
the Court's rules made violations difficult to prove and that they
were the wrong rules anyway. I am not sure the political process
is capable of consistently distinguishing these two grounds, but,
at any rate, the Court had never suggested that Congress had to
distinguish them. So no one did.
Another reason the legislative record understates Smith viola-
tions is that the proponents of RFRA could not mention the most
egregious violations. Genuine contemporary persecutions make
bad examples politically, because, almost by definition, seriously
persecuted religions are highly unpopular. Too many Congress-
men would have intuitively sided with the persecutors.
In a 1990 article, I described two contemporary cases of perse-
cution motivated by deep-seated religious hostility, limited only
by the amount of energy the persecutors were willing-to invest in
the enterprise," One case involved the so-called cults, such as
the Hare Krishnas, the Unification Church, and the
Scientologists. The other involved the Santeria in South Florida. I
did not mention either of these cases in my testimony to Congress.
All sides in this debate, except for Lino Graglia, 77 now offer
175. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
176. See Laycock, supra note 171, at 64-68.
177. See Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice
and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1996) (arguing that the ordinances
were generally applicable because sacrifice is "incongruous and offensive in secular-
ized, sensitized contemporary America," and thus distinguishable from other killings
of animals).
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Lukumi as the prototype of a Smith violation. Lukumi was a
unanimous decision. The opinion suggested that Hialeah violat-
ed the Court's "fundamental nonpersecution principle. 78 Once
the Court's attention was focused on the discrimination in the
ordinances, it became an easy case. But Congress did not view it
that way. Stephen Solarz, the lead sponsor of RFRA in the
House, wanted to file a congressional amicus brief in Lukumi,
but he could not get a single Representative or Senator to even
consider signing such a brief.179 The Santeria religion was too
unpopular to touch.
This case illustrates a systemic problem. How can a
majoritarian political process ever enact rights for unpopular
minorities? Creation of constitutional rights is a precommitment
strategy; the majority, or at least its elected leadership, disables
itself from violating rights that it may want to violate.
History suggests only two ways to enact such rights. The most
effective way is to focus attention on a violator of rights that is
not the body enacting the protections. In the early national peri-
od, bills of rights were aimed at the King and Parliament, or at
the memory of the King and Parliament, and then at the new
federal government, which the antifederalists found much more
fearsome and untrustworthy than the state governments. 8 '
Much of the rights talk of the time was in terms of protecting
the whole people against their agents.' Madison saw that in
a republic the greatest threat to liberty was in the majority of
the people,'82 but few others saw so far. During Reconstruction,
178. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523
(1993).
179. Interview with David Lachman, Staff, to Rep. Solarz, in Washington, D.C.
(May 14, 1992).
180. See Douglas Laycock, Individual Liberty and Constitutional Architecture: The
Founders' Prompt Correction of Their Own Mistake, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 75,
82-86 (1993) (elaborating the point in the text). See generally THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 3-29 (U.S. 1776) (reciting grievances against George III); THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert Storing ed., 1981) (compiling arguments in op-
position to creating the federal government).
181. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131 (1991) (emphasizing that the Bill of Rights was designed more to protect the
people from their agents than to protect minorities from majorities).
182. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 19-20 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
1981).
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the southern states were the obvious and egregious threat to
liberty, and the northern states were voting on the new
protections and coercing the South to ratify." In the great civ-
il rights legislation of the 1960s, the North and West reached
consensus that there was much injustice in the South.
The other way to enact minority rights is to focus attention on
the broad principle and to avoid focusing attention on the exam-
ples that tempt majorities to violate the principle-i.e., to avoid
the examples that most make it necessary to enact special
protections for the principle. RFRA's supporters were quite open
about this. Representative Solarz testified that the worst possible
.outcome would be for Congress to vote for specific rules, protecting
the religions it liked and excluding the religions it did not like.'84 I
testified that "[religious liberty is popular in principle, but in spe-
cific applications it quickly gets entangled in other issues."1" This
was another barely comprehended disagreement between the
parties in Mores. The opponents said that RFRA's scope showed
that it was disproportionate and not a response to any real prob-
lem;... we said that RFRA's scope was an act of the highest prin-
ciple, the only way Congress could avoid discriminating against
smaller and less popular faiths. 7
Another important reason Smith is viewed so narrowly in the
legislative record is that we were describing reality accurately at
the time. The RFRA hearings were held in 1991 and 1992, when
the few lower court decisions under Smith had in fact given it
the worst possible interpretation. Neither Smith's exceptions nor
its neutrality requirement appeared to have any content.88
183. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 500-07 (1989) (describing the ratification process).
184. See House Hearings, supra note 39, at 124 (statement of Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz).
185. Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 77 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor
of Law, University of Texas).
186. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
188. See Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 199-
200 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that hybrid freedom of association claim adds nothing to
free exercise claim); Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914
F.2d 348, 354-55 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that landmark ordinance is neutral and
generally applicable because it potentially applies to all buildings, even though it is
applied in fact only in individualized processes and only to a tiny fraction of all
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Courts were upholding, or subjecting to rational basis review,
laws that expressly applied only to churches or only to religious
practices." 9 RFRA's advocates could not reasonably have ig-
nored this worst case scenario emerging from the cases, or given
equal prominence to the theoretical possibility of a more protec-
tive interpretation.
After completion of the hearings, the Court decided Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,0 which ap-
pears to have given real content to the requirements of neutrali-
ty and general applicability. Lukumi compared the local ordi-
nances regulating religious practices to a broad range of other
state and local laws dealing with analogous secular conduct and
with secular conduct that caused analogous harms.' As part
of its holding, Lukumi incorporated and expanded on Smith's
dictum that if a state permits exceptions for secular conduct,
then it must have a compelling reason for refusing exceptions for
analogous religious conduct.'92
Some lower court interpretations of Smith began to change in
light of Lukumi. One district court held that a rule requiring all
university freshmen to live in the dorm was not neutral and
generally applicable, because nearly a third of freshmen were
covered by various exceptions.' The Free Exercise
Clause-not RFRA-therefore required an exception for a fresh-
man who wanted to live in a religious group house."9 Another
district court held that a landmarking law was not neutral and
generally applicable, because it contained three exceptions for
various secular situations.9 The Free Exercise Clause--not
buildings); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice & Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding secular exception irrelevant to free exercise claim).
189. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586
(11th Cir. 1991) (upholding ban on "sacrifice" of animals, defined to exclude any sec-
ular killing of animals), rev'd, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City
of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that exclusion of churches
from commercial zones, by ordinance that expressly listed permitted uses, was neu-
tral and generally applicable law).
190. 508 U.S. 520 (1993); see supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
191. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 539, 543-45.
192. See id. at 537.
193. See Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-56 (D. Neb. 1996).
194. See id. at 1549-58.
195. See Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 886
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RFRA-therefore required an exception for a church stuck with
a useless landmark.9 ' If these decisions are good law, and I
think they are, then violations of Smith are common, but diffi-
cult to litigate. Simplifying the litigation of these constitutional
violations would be a remedial measure even under Mores.
Whatever the Court may say when the meaning of Smith is
squarely before it and fully briefed, Mores did not take seriously
the possibility that Smith violations might be common or even
that there might be more than one way to prove a Smith viola-
tion. In its discussion of Smith, the Court reaffirmed the hybrid
rights exception, and it reaffirmed the rule that exemptions for
secular hardship require exemptions for religious hardship.'97
But the Court did not mention these rules when it considered
whether RFRA was a proportionate response to violations of
Smith. In that part of the opinion, it used the phrase "religious
bigotry" as a shorthand for what Smith required.198 This short-
hand made it easier to argue that RFRA was a disproportionate
response to a small number of actual violations, but for the
reasons already stated, it is not an accurate summary of Smith.
Indeed, the word "bigotry" never appears in either the Smith or
Lukumi opinions. 9
Religious bigotry may be an accurate statement of Justice
Kennedy's view of Smith. He wrote Mores, and he wrote Lukumi,
including the passage on motive that attracted only one vote be-
sides his own."0 He spent some time at oral argument in
Lukumi trying to get me to admit that discriminatory treatment
is relevant only as evidence of bad motive.2"' Maybe he would
confine Smith to bad motive, but the Court has not done so.
It is impossible to know how the Court will ultimately resolve
this argument over the meaning of Smith. But in Mores, it was
(D. Md. 1996).
196. See id. at 883-87.
197. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997).
198. See id. at 2171.
199. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
200. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
201. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Lukumi (No. 91-948), available in 1992 WL
687913, at *16-19 (Nov. 4, 1992).
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one more enormous disagreement that got far less space in the
briefs than it deserved given its complexity and the importance
it turned out to have under the Court's new test.
VII. LAND-USE REGULATION OF CHURCHES
Finally, the two sides fundamentally disagreed about land-use
regulation of churches in general, and about the City of Boerne's
ordinance in particular. The Court treated land-use regulation as
an obvious example of neutral and generally applicable law. °2
RFRA's supporters believe that land-use regulation is an unusu-
ally clear example of a regulatory process that violates Smith.
Land-use regulation often targets churches, because churches
tend to build distinctive properties. One study shows that in the
city of New York, churches are landmarked at a rate forty-two
times higher than secular properties.2 ' With or without target-
ing, land-use regulation has an enormous disparate impact on
churches. It is administered through highly discretionary and
individualized processes that leave ample room for deliberate,
but hidden, discrimination. There is substantial evidence of
widespread hostility to locating or expanding nonmainstream
churches, and some evidence of hostility to all churches. In the
city of Chicago and some of its suburbs, churches allege that the
cities administer zoning regulation in such a way that it is near-
ly impossible to start a new church without consent of surround-
ing owners, and that this consent is so often withheld that find-
ing a site for a new church is often impossible.2 Many of
these cases are not about efforts to build new structures but
simply efforts to rent and occupy an existing building. Journal-
ists have reported that new suburbs on the fringe of urban
growth often exclude churches, even from mainstream denomi-
nations.0 5 Denominations that account for only nine percent of
202. See Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
203. See N.J. L'Heureux, Jr., Ministry v. Mortar: A Landmark Conflict, in GOVERN-
MENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 2, 164, 168 (Dean M. Kelley ed., 1986).
204. For illustrative factual allegations, see Abierta v. City of Chicago, 949 F.
Supp. 637, 639-40 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 129 F.3d 899 (7th
Cir. 1997); C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, No. 94-C-6151, 1996 WL 89241, at *1, *9o13
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Celestial Church of Christ, Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 93-
C-7610, 1994 WL 282304, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1994).
205. See R. Gustav Neibuhr, Here is the Church; As for the People, They're Pick-
780 [Vol. 39:743
CONCEPTUAL GULFS IN FLORES
the population account for about half the reported church zoning
cases; these denominations plus unaffiliated churches account
for less than a quarter of the population but more than two-
thirds of reported church zoning cases."' Jews account for
about two percent of the population but twenty percent of the re-
ported church zoning cases.0 7 That is, the zoning process
disproportionately excludes small and unfamiliar faiths. This
discrimination is often unprovable in any individual case, but
when large numbers of cases are examined, the pattern is clear.
The processes of administering zoning laws and designating
landmarks are highly individualized. Standards tend to be vague
and manipulable; zoning for a parcel is easily changed if those
in power desire to change it.20 8 Many key decisions are made
at the level of individual parcels in applications for special per-
mits or variances or in votes on zoning changes or in landmark
designations. These land-use laws are often not neutral, and
they are almost never generally applicable in any meaningful
sense.0 9 The courts should subject resulting burdens on
churches to strict scrutiny under Employment Division v. Smith.
Indeed, to subject the location of churches to the zoning and
landmarking procedures in many jurisdictions is to subject the
First Amendment right to gather for worship to a standardless
licensing scheme, in violation of settled principles developed
under the Free Speech Clause.210
Boerne fit this pattern, although the city is too small for sta-
tistical analysis. The historic district is centered in the downtown
area and originally extended south as a strip down either side of
eting It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at Al.
206. These data are gathered in the Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Flores (No. 95-2074), avail-
able in 1997 WL 10290, at *30, *4a [hereinafter Mormon Brief]. Professors Cole Dur-
ham and Frederick Gedicks supervised this research at Brigham Young University,
inspired by Rebecca Beynon, Regulation of Church Land Use and Discrimination
Against Minority Faiths (unpublished paper on file with author).
207. Mormon Brief, supra note 206, at *4a.
208. See, e.g., Abierta, 949 F. Supp. at 640.
209. See, e.g., id; L'Heureux, Jr., supra note 203, at 169-71 (describing the impact
of a New York landmarking law).
210. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pubrg Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988);
Griffin v. City of Lovell, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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Main Street.21' The boundary bisected the church, including the
front entryway and the two large bell towers on either side, but
excluding the sanctuary.2  St. Peter's did not oppose the his-
toric district as thus defined, and it designed a new church that
preserved the bell towers.2 " The city refused a permit for that
design, and the historic commission indicated that no part of the
existing church could be removed or modified. 4
Eventually the city passed a new ordinance, adding the rest of
St. Peter's Church to the historic district.25 The boundary
change in this ordinance applied only to St. Peter's and to no
other property.2 6 The historic commission made other deci-
sions about individual parcels, deciding not to extend the district
to include certain property owners who would object, 217 but
overriding the church's objections to the inclusion of the sanctu-
ary. The historic district included only a tiny fraction of all the
properties in Boerne, and a larger fraction of all the older build-
ings in Boerne. I have never alleged anti-religious or anti-
Catholic motive in Boerne, but there was objectively unequal
treatment-some older buildings were included, and some were
not, and the church was in the disadvantaged group. The one-
211. Interview with Thomas Drought, attorney for St. Peter's Church, in Austin,
Texas (on or about Mar. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Drought Austin Interview].
212. Id.; see also Stipulated Facts, in Joint Appendix at 68, City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (stipulating that boundary had bifurcated the church).
213. See Second Amended Complaint 12, in Joint Appendix, supra note 212, at 7.
214. See Letter from Phillip M. Ball, Chairman, Historic Landmark Commission, to
Ed Beasley, Building Inspector, in Joint Appendix, supra note 212, at 39.
215. See City of Boerne, Tex. Ordinance 94-17; see also Stipulation of Facts, in
Joint Appendix, supra note 212, at 70-71 (describing effect of this ordinance).
216. See City of Boerne, Tex. Ordinance 94-17.
217. See, e.g., Historic Landmark Comm'n Minutes, City of Boerne (July 6, 1995)
(discussing whether to extend historic district to include the Walker House, which
was in danger of demolition); Historic Landmark Comm'n Minutes, City of Boerne
(Jan. 23, 1996) (discussing whether the Walker House was sufficiently linked to the
rest of the district to support the power to include it); Historic Landmark Comm'n
Minutes, City of Boerne (Feb. 20, 1996) (discussing "whether it is a wise idea, be-
cause of the present litigation, at this time to add more property to the district," to
which one commissioner responded that "the only one they may have a problem with
is the Walker House"). The Walker House was not added to the district. Telephone
Interview with Thomas Drought, attorney for St. Peter's Church (on or about July
15, 1997).
218. Personal inspections, Feb. 9, 1997, and Nov. 28, 1997.
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property ordinance adding the sanctuary to the historic district
was not generally applicable if words have any meaning. This
departure from general applicability should have required com-
pelling justification under Smith19 and Lukumi.220
In addition, the ordinance defined a tract of land, and so far as
I can tell, it took all economic value out of that tract. This is a
lawyer's opinion, not an appraiser's or developer's, but I find it
hard to imagine any viable economic use for an empty church in a
small town. St. Peter's retained the right to use the church as a
place of worship for half the congregation, but that right had no
economic value-St. Peter's would have had to abandon the prop-
erty and build elsewhere rather than continue permanently with
the old church. St. Peter's could realize economic value from the
old church only if there were another congregation of just the
right size but without a church of its own. Regulation that re-
moves all economically viable use from a parcel is a taking.22'
Almost none of this was in the record. In retrospect, we should
have declined the offer of an immediate appeal and tried the case
on our free exercise, takings, hybrid (free exercise and takings),
and state-law claims. Win or lose, the RFRA issue could then
have been argued with some flesh on the skeletal concept of neu-
tral and generally applicable laws. But the case went up on the
abstract question of RFRA's constitutionality, without a factual
record, and the Court acted on uninformed assumptions about the
substance and process of land use regulation.
The church's free exercise, takings, hybrid, and state-law claims
were never tested in court, because after the remand and before
the trial, the parties entered into a settlement.222 The settlement
is not substantially different from earlier near settlements, includ-
ing one that both sides had agreed to before the city had second
thoughts.2" Where the actual settlement differs from the earlier
219. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
220. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
221. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992).
222. See Church and Town Settle Dispute on Building, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997,
at A21. The preliminary settlement reported in that story has since become final.
223. Telephone Interview with Thomas Drought, attorney for St. Peter's Church (on
or about October 1, 1997) [hereinafter Drought Telephone Interview].
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failed settlements, both sides gave a little more."
The changes that made settlement possible appear to be more
political than legal. The church and the city council have long
been open to settlement. The historic commission, a single-issue
regulatory body, was opposed to all previous settlements, and it
is opposed to this one." 5 But it does not have a veto, and this
time the city council overrode the commission's advice.2 6
Like all settlements, this one avoids the risk and expense of
further litigation. It gives both sides what they wanted most. It
will enable the church to build a place of worship large enough
to seat the congregation, and it will preserve most of the old
church. 7 A small portion at the rear will be torn down, and
that is why the historic commission is opposed.2"
The key to the settlement is the church's willingness and abil-
ity to spend very large sums on historic preservation. The imme-
diate cost is not yet known, but it will exceed the $500,000 esti-
mated cost of earlier proposals, 29 and the church will assume
the permanent burden of maintaining both the old and new
churches. Ability and willingness to spend such large sums has
been imposed on St. Peter's as a precondition for worship in
Boerne. For a poorer church, or for a smaller church that had
outgrown its old building but not by so large a margin, this set-
tlement would have been impossible. And the settlement seems
to concede in principle that the city has the right to control plac-
es of worship.
I believe that the ordinance in Flores was not generally appli-
cable, but that does not go to the heart of the problem. The facts
underlying the dispute and the settlement illustrate why consti-
tutional rights should be protected against burdens and not just
against discrimination or lack of general applicability. From the
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. For the earlier cost estimate, see Affidavit of Gregory M. Davis, the architect
for the church, in Joint Appendix, supra note 212, at 42. The settlement requires
substantially all the structural repairs required by the earlier settlement proposals,
plus the cost of demolishing and replacing part of the parish hall. Drought Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 223.
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viewpoint of RFRA's supporters, this dispute was an example of
government imposing immense burdens on the free exercise of
religion to serve an insignificant interest of doubtful legitimacy.
St. Peter's has voluntarily preserved the oldest church on the
site, built in 1867.2"0 From the beginning of the controversy, it
had voluntarily agreed to preserve the front facade and bell
towers of the current church, built in 1923." 1 I do not believe
the church should have to do either of these things, but it had
agreed to do them. The dispute was over whether it also had to
preserve the sanctuary of the 1923 church. Under the settle-
ment, it will preserve most but not all of that sanctuary. 2
Preserving the 1923 sanctuary is a deadweight loss to the
church. It will be used for services with small attendance, 23
but there is nothing the church can do in the 1923 sanctuary
that it would not be able to do in the new sanctuary that it will
have to build anyway. Preservation of the 1923 sanctuary is
expensive; it will require a large upfront investment for struc-
tural repairs, and then the building will be a white elephant in
perpetuity.' Building a new church behind the 1923 sanctu-
ary requires partial demolition of the parish hall, which then
must be rebuilt elsewhere on the property. 5
The bottom line is that St. Peter's first priority must be to pre-
serve two pet churches for the pleasure of architecture buffs; if it
does that, then the city will let it build a third church to actually
worship in. There appears to be no limiting principle; if the city
and county continue their growth patterns, the grandchildren of
the current generation may fight over whether St. Peter's has to
preserve three pet churches and build a fourth for worship.
All this burden on the church produces little benefit to the
city. The description in the city's brief, of a "highly visible
church set on a hill,"26 was misleading at best. Only the bell
230. Drought Austin Interview, supra note 211.
231. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
233. Drought Telephone Interview, supra note 223.
234. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
235. Drought Telephone Interview, supra note 223.
236. Brief of Petitioner, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), available
in 1996 WL 689630, *2.
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towers and front facade are highly visible, and then only if you
are standing right in front of them, in the park across Main
Street. 7 The sanctuary, which was the subject of the litiga-
tion, is mostly hidden from view from any point outside the
church property. Approaching the church on Main Street, the
sanctuary is completely hidden from the north."3 Approaching
from the south, one can see parts of the south facade through
the trees for the last half block.39
The downtown area at the center of the historic district has
an eclectic mix of buildings from almost every period of the city's
history, from well-restored nineteenth century landmarks to
thoroughly modern gas stations."0 Most of these buildings line
either side of U.S. 87, a heavily traveled four-lane highway. 4
The highway, the traffic, and the mix of new and nondescript
buildings sharply limit any sense of history about the district as
a district.
Such unity as exists is commercial and comes from the busi-
nesses inside these buildings. Ordinary businesses serving local
residents survive, but there is a concentration of antique shops,
restaurants, a bed and breakfast, a bakery, an ice cream shop,
gift shops, and similar tourist businesses, many of them offering
historic ambience of varying degrees of authenticity. 2 In
short, this district is mostly about bringing in shoppers from
San Antonio. Historic preservation is secondary to augmenting
the faux-historic theme; old buildings with no connection to
Boerne or even to Central Texas have been hauled in and placed
on lots in the historic district with the approval of the historic
commission."4s
237. Personal inspections, supra note 218.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Minutes of Historic Landmark Comm'n (July 6, 1995) (approving proposal
to bring in "an old railroad depot building from Encinal, Texas"); Minutes of Historic
Landmark Comm'n (Aug. 29, 1995) (approving proposal to bring in "an old house,
which is located on IH-10," to the Kendall Inn property); Minutes of Historic Land-
mark Comm'n (Jan. 23, 1996) (approving proposal to bring in "an old frame church"
and "a log structure . . . that, characteristically, would have been used in east Tex-
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The church is far removed from the heart of the tourist and
shopping area-several blocks beyond the last tourist shop, past
the intersection of U.S. 87 and Texas 46, across a bridge over a
substantial stream, and without continuous sidewalks connect-
ing the church to the shopping area.' The church is not visi-
ble from the shopping area, or from any point between the
church and the shopping area.2" It is not integral to the rest of
the historic district either architecturally or commercially. The
church is for all practical purposes an isolated structure.
The church is not very old, not very distinctive, and truth be
told, not very attractive.2 " It is not a Spanish mission, but a
twentieth century imitation of a Spanish mission. Behind the
bell towers, there is nothing distinctive about it. If government
can require preservation of the sanctuary at St. Peter's, it can
require preservation of almost any church old enough to need
remodeling or expansion. St. Peter's is just an ordinary church,
nothing special-but landmark law treats all churches as spe-
cial, and subjects them to special burdens.
The asserted specialness of churches brings the discussion of
St. Peter's back to doctrine: imposing special burdens on church-
es violates the Free Exercise Clause under Smith27 and
Lukumi.' The city's interest in Flores was a very modest in-
terest, but more fundamentally, it was an illegitimate interest.
The features that made the church even arguably distinctive,
and that made the city fight so hard to include it in the district,
were features of religious architecture. The interest asserted was
precisely the interest in diverting a product and instrumentality
as," to the Kendall Inn property); Minutes of Historic Landmark Comm'n (Feb. 20,
1996) (approving proposal to build two new buildings on the Kendall Inn property);
Minutes of Historic Landmark Comm'n (March 5, 1996) (approving proposal to bring
in a log cabin from Waco, two buildings connected by a dog run from near Enchant-
ed Rock, and a house from San Antonio, to the Kendall Inn property). The owner of
the Kendall Inn property is constructing a private tourist complex around his inn,
mostly of buildings from outside Boerne.
244. Personal inspections, supra note 218.
245. Id.
246. Id.; Interview with Father Anthony Cummins, in Boerne, Texas (Feb. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter Cummins Interview].
247. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
248. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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of religion-both the church building and the large sums re-
quired to maintain it-from religious to secular purposes. The
church is no longer needed as a church; in all but name it will
become an architectural museum, preserved for its physical
appearance.
It is useful to consider whether the secular interest in pre-
serving this church is sufficient to justify the city in paying the
costs of preservation. Where secular historic value is real and
substantial, as in the case of the eighteenth century Spanish
missions in San Antonio, the church and the government have
cooperated to provide public access and interpretation at govern-
ment expense." s But even there, the Archdiocese has borne the
entire cost of preservation for fear of Establishment Clause prob-
lemsY ° Where secular historic value is minimal and religious
value is substantially all there is, government financial support
for structural repairs would likely violate the Establishment
Clause, lacking secular purpose and effect, with the claim of sec-
ular historic value dismissed as pretextual.25' One can only
imagine the reaction in an Establishment Clause case if the city
described the church as it did in its brief in the court of appeals:
"the 1923 Sanctuary that is the Spirit and Image of the City
itself." 2 If courts would not find enough secular value to justi-
fy government money, they should not find enough secular value
to justify government control.
Mores was not a case about preventing the church from harm-
ing its neighbors; it was a case about requiring the church to
provide something that only a church would ever provide. No one
thinks the city could build a church itself, or require St. Peter's to
build a church, and no one is likely to build a church-like struc-
ture for secular uses. It is clear that neither the city nor the
neighbors have any right, as against a church, to the existence of
249. The arrangement is described in Proposed Cooperative Agreement for the Ad-
ministration of the San Antonio Missions National Historic Park, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 717 (1982).
250. See id. at 719-21.
251. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1971) (holding that government
cannot pay for construction of buildings that might be used for sectarian instruction
or worship services).
252. Brief of Appellee at 2, Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
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a church building. Yet once the church is built, the city is allowed
to create such a right by fiat, and to make that right so strong
that it overrides any countervailing interests of the church itself.
If the power to landmark churches is not restricted, the churches
of America will be unable to build a place of worship without
submitting to the threat and disproportionate risk that they even-
tually will be required to maintain in perpetuity a building that
has become dysfunctional for its religious use.
To RFRA's opponents, the historic district at issue in Flores
was ordinary land-use regulation having nothing to do with reli-
gion; the problems at St. Peter's did not even raise an issue of
religious liberty. Everyone has to comply with land-use regula-
tion, and sometimes it is burdensome, but it is only money. St.
Peter's does not have to give up its exercise of religion; it only
has to spend more money. That is a commercial burden, not a
religious burden. For the supporters of landmarking laws, it is
unthinkable that anyone could have a right not to be
landmarked. Landmarking law is a product of the post-1937
view that burdensome social and economic regulation requires
very little justification, and its supporters believe that First
Amendment rights have no more weight than property rights.
Once again, the two sides stared across a conceptual chasm,
barely able to comprehend each other.
The Court itself stated the most extreme version of the view
that landmarking churches is no different from landmarking any
other kind of property. It said that land use regulation of
churches does not even have disparate impact. 3 The Court
was wrong at many levels.
First, there is disparate impact in the application and admin-
istration of these laws, as the data cited above show. Churches
are far more likely to be landmarked than secular buildings,W
and minority faiths are far more likely to have serious zoning
trouble than mainstream faithsY55
Second, there is disparate impact in the economic effect of
these laws on church buildings. Property owners in downtown
253. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997).
254. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 204-07 and accompanying text.
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Boerne appear to be making money from the historic district; at
least one entrepreneur is aggressively expanding his tourist
complex. 56 Retail and commercial buildings can be converted
to uses that benefit from the historic motif; restaurants and
antique shops are replacing other kinds of merchandise, but
either way, business goes on and landlords earn rents. The own-
ers of homes in the historic district can still live in their homes.
Owners unwilling to tolerate the continuing interference of the
historic commission can sell to buyers who like the idea of own-
ing a landmark.
None of these options were open to the church. The church
could not use the building for its longstanding purpose because
the congregation simply would not fit."7 Several hundred peo-
ple a week who wanted to attend Mass were not able to do so;
they suddenly appeared when the church took up temporary
quarters in the senior citizens' center. 8 The church could not
sell the building and move elsewhere, because no one else had
any use for it either. It was not feasible for the church to split
its religious community in half, and no government should force
it to take such a step in any event. I do not doubt that it is bur-
densome to own property in the historic district, but only the
church was deprived of its longstanding use of the property and
left with no substitute.
Finally, the landmark law created disparate impact simply
because the burden fell on an express constitutional right in the
case of the church. Indeed, this has been the standard analysis
of RFRA's opponents. The Court in Smith made the analogy to
disparate impact cases:
Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that
make classifications based on race,.., so too we strictly scru-
tinize governmental classifications based on religion. But we
have held that race-neutral laws that have the effect of
disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group
256. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
257. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
258. Cummins Interview, supra note 246. This fact was not in the record because
the church moved its best-attended Masses after the judgment in the trial court.
The senior citizens' center graciously provided free space, but the barn-like sheet
metal structure was not conducive to Catholic liturgy. Id.
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do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause, see Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976)... Our conclusion that generally appli-
cable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening
a particular religious practice need not be justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible
with these precedents. 9
I have argued that this analysis understates the burden on
religion.26 But until Flores, no one ever doubted that these
burdens on religion were at least a disparate impact. We argued
that Smith's analogy of religious burdens to disparate impact
was dispositive of RFRA's constitutionality: that Congress could
require states to justify religious burdens just as it required
them to justify disparate impact.26 1 But once again, there was
no ground on which to stand; the Court was not constrained by
anything it had said in the past.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I began by saying that if Flores means what it says, then it is
by far the most important of the recent round of federalism cas-
es. United States v. Lopez262 does not threaten anything at the
heart of the commerce power. New York v. United States2" and
Printz v. United States2 4 do not limit the range of policies Con-
gress can enact. They hold only that Congress must implement
its policy choices through its own laws and the federal executive,
and cannot require states to act for it. Seminole Tribe v. Flori-
da 265 will leave many state violations of federal law uncompen-
259. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (most citations
omitted).
260. See Laycock, supra note 171, at 15-16 (arguing that this analysis is another
consequence of treating the substantive right to free exercise of religion as a mere
equality right, and that a direct burden on a religious practice is worse than a sta-
tistically disparate impact).
261. See Brief of Respondent Flores, Fores (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL
10293, at *10-11.
262. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
263. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
264. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
265. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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sated, but it does not affect compensation for violation of Four-
teenth Amendment rights,266 and it does not eliminate power
to secure state compliance with federal law." 7 Justice Kennedy
also tried to roll back Ex parte Young last Term, but he got only
two votes.266 None of these decisions change the core of the
constitutional structure.
Flores may. The delegation to Congress of power to protect
liberty in the states was an essential part of the structural
change wrought by the Civil War. Flores appears to say that
that power has no independent content, that it is derivative of
judicial interpretation, that there are not three federal branches
empowered to protect liberty in the states, but only one. The
Court now asserts unchecked power to shrink the Fourteenth
Amendment to as small a scope as it chooses. Right or wrong,
this decision goes to the core of the constitutional structure for
protecting liberty. Needless to say, I think it was wrong.
266. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
267. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
268. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2075-40 (1997).
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